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DURKHEIMIAN EPIPHANIES: THE IMPORTANCE OF
ENGAGED SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LEGAL STUDIES
CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW*
D AVID TRUBEK'S telling' of the Law and Society story2 is just
one version of that story. I agree with much of it, and I think
Professor of Law and Acting Co-Director, Center for the Study of Women, University
of California, Los Angeles; A.B., 1971, Barnard College; J.D., 1974, University of Pennsylvania
Law School.
1. This article originated as comments to the 1989 Mason Ladd Lecture given by David
Trubek at the Florida State University College of Law. Because the published version of the
lecture has changed from the oral version, and some of the commentator's earlier comments
have been incorporated into the written version that appears in this volume, these written words
differ somewhat from my comments at the Symposium event itself on February 24, 1989, but the
ideas expressed here remain essentially the same. This is only one forum in which these issues
and conversations are being expressed and addressed. See generally Levine, Goose Bumps and
"The Search for Signs of Intelligent Life" in Sociolegal Studies: After Twenty-Five Years, 24
LAW & Soc'Y REv. 9 (1990) (Presidential Address, 1989 Annual Law & Society Meeting).
I would like to thank Felice Levine for the many conversations over the years that have
contributed to the commitment I have to law and social science as described in this article.
Thanks also to Robert Meadow, my sometime collaborator in socio-legal research, for critical
and helpful comments on this paper. I am also appreciative of the opportunity I had to serve on
the Program Committee of the twenty-fifth anniversary meeting of the Law and Society Associa-
tion, which permitted me to delve a bit into the history of the association. I hope someone will
someday write a more complete intellectual history of the forces that produced the association
and its early work.
2. Trubek credits his colleague Professor Patricia Williams with "showing [him] how per-
sonal narrative can be employed in scholarly argument." Trubek, Back to the Future: The
Short, Happy Life of the Law and Society Movement 18 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 1 n.l (1990). With-
out criticizing the "narrative" work in much recent scholarship, particularly among minorities
and women (see generally Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989) (a symposium on
narratives)), and while noting that narrative is a form of scholarship I generally enjoy and often
employ, we must remember that a personal narrative is still a personal narrative-the story of
one teller. Trubek's telling of the Law and Society story through the lens of his own experience
must then be taken for what it is-his own personal story. I believe others, particularly those
outside of the law school or those of different ages, genders, disciplines, and other social circum-
stances, might tell different stories. I suggest that the personal narratives of those who are privi-
leged in our worlds of legal knowing (i.e., many white males) have a different tone than those of
disempowered people who are trying to be heard (perhaps for the first time). Personal narrative
can turn into "telling it like it is" for everyone, which may defeat the purposes of some who use
the personal narrative form to "correct" or subvert dominant discourses with stories of other
experiences. Whether one is situated in the dominant discourse is, of course, relative. To conven-
tional doctrinal legal scholars, all of us in socio-legal studies are outsiders, but within socio-legal
studies, Trubek's is one of the "dominant" voices. Many other scholars have recently tried their
hand at telling "the law and society story." Their works include Friedman, The Law and Society
Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 763 (1986); Macaulay, Law and the Behavioral Sciences: Is There
Any. There There, 6 LAW & POL'Y Q. 149 (1984); Sarat & Silbey, The Pull of the Policy Audi-
ence, 10 LAW & POL'Y Q. 97 (1988).
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Trubek and I have similar goals with respect to where we think the
law and social science relationship should be heading. Nevertheless,
we have some different points of emphases and approaches, and our
personal experiences with socio-legal studies are different, given who
we are. In this Commentary I will focus on some of those differences
to push the analysis a bit further and, I hope, to suggest some arenas
for further work in an engaged social science of law.
To "join the issues" (in legal parlance), I think that Trubek has
overstated the influence of the legal academy on the development of
the field of socio-legal research and concomitantly overstated the sig-
nificance of law in our society. He also has overstated the "power" of
the legal profession on the legal academy, understated the political
commitments and engagement of law and society work from the be-
ginning, and somewhat simplified the story by "objectifying" and
"homogenizing" several different strains of it.' On the other hand, he
has well stated some of the significant epistemological, as well as po-
litical, issues confronting our field, and I want to explore those as
well. Like Trubek, I am committed to a "critical empiricism," though
I would prefer to call it "engaged empiricism." I may be a little less
skeptical about certain forms of "positivism," which I would prefer
to think of as what we learn from rigorous social scientific studies that
reveal the patterns of social life.
In this Commentary I will discuss what law and social science has
meant to me. This includes a journey through some of the sociology
of knowledge questions raised by Trubek, supplemented by some is-
sues raised by feminist analyses of our epistemology in science gener-
ally and, more specifically, law and social science. I also want to
explore the relation of socio-legal studies to legal education-not only
to scholarship, but also this relation's implications for teaching and
learning in the law school and for practicing lawyers.4 And finally,
3. This is one of the dangers of narrative. To tell "a" story, a narrator adopts a point of
view and narrates. While new forms of fiction have experimented with multi-voiced narrations
or narrations that play fast and loose with time and logical sequence, most legal narratives still
have a certain "univocality" and logic to them. Trubek's narrative has this element of logical
progression from one stage or description of law to another ("Imperial" law, "Realisi" law)
that may underplay the contentions and complexities inherent in the co-existence of competing
visions or understandings of law and legal phenomena. See, for example, the present debates
within Critical Legal Studies about the significance of rights and legal advocacy for effecting
social change, including Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Le-
gitimation in Anti-discrimination Law, 101 HAxv. L. REv. 1331 (1988); Symposium on Minority
Critiques of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 22 H~Av. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 971 (1987) (Both
Crenshaw and authors in the symposium argue that while the struggle for legal rights may be
problematic for some critics, law is still an important domain for the minority civil rights strug-
gle.).
4. As a clinical teacher and socio-le'gal scholar, I have long been urging the exploration of
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like Trubek, I want to reflect on where this field is going and the rela-
tion of the knowledge produced by socio-legal studies to the politics
of law and social change.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES: "DURKEIMIAN
EPiPHANIEs"
Trubek speaks of the "idea of law and society" as the study of law
and legal institutions by the social sciences. This was, in its time, a
relatively new ideal because law was seen as the study of doctrine or
scientific principles in the Langdellian sense. This view sees law as its
own system of knowledge bounded by its own rules and regularities.
This view explains, in its own way, how people ought to act-in set-
ting normative principles-and describes how people do in fact act-
in setting standards such as the "reasonable man" (sic) 6 in negligence
law. The teachings of legal realism, and subsequently law and society,
have to do with recognizing the embeddedness of law in social institu-
tions and social life and the variability of human legal behavior. Law
is not a system unto itself. The desire that we should be a nation "of
laws and not men" is an aspiration that-ideally-uniform abstract
principles-rather than arbitrary human will-should govern all of us.
Adherence to the law varies, 7 however, and the meaning of the law
varies.8 Additionally, participation in law making, law breaking, law
the connections between empirical research and "practical" knowing in legal institutions and law
practice. See generally Menkel-Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories About
Lawyering, 29 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 555 (1980); Menkel-Meadow, Two Contradictory Criticisms of
Clinical Education: Dilemmas and Directions in Lawyering Education, 4 ANTIOCH L.J. 287
(1986) [hereinafter Dilemmas]. My interest flows from an old tradition in the pragmatism and
educational theories of John Dewey. For a good example of his work, see J. DEWEY, EXPERI-
m 'ca & EDUCATION (1938). This tradition, in my view, is now best represented in the works of
Donald A. Schon. See generally D. SCHON, EDUCATING THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER (1987)
[hereinafter EDUCATInG]; D. SCHON, Tan REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER (1983).
5. This scholarly approach was not a completely new idea, as Trubek recounts, because of
the work in the founding of legal realism. Consider the work in this area by Roscoe Pound in
Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REv. 12 (1910). Political scientists would
argue they have been doing socio-legal research since their beginning, particularly those in the
public law field.
6. Recent feminist critiques of this "male" standard of the law include Bender, A Law-
yer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988); Donovan & Wildman, Is
the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on Self-Defense and Provocation, 14 Loy.
L.A.L. REv. 435 (1981).
7. These are exemplified in the "gap" studies. See generally Abel, Law Books and Books
About Law (Book Review), 26 STAN. L. REv. 175 (1973); Trubek, supra note 2, at 8 n.16.
8. For an example of this observation in the area of deconstructive legal scholarship, see
Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985). For
examples in the growing area of law and literature studies, see R. PosNER, LAW AND LITERA-
TUBE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988); R. WEISBERG, Tan FAILURE OF THE WORD (1984); J.
1990]
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enforcement, and legal institutions varies. We undertake the study of
law by or through social science to understand why these things vary.
Additionally, we want to uncover, where possible, the meanings and
explanations for the patterns of human behavior within legal institu-
tions and outside of legal institutions as structured by the interaction
of legal rules and institutions on the one hand and human actors on
the other.
Thus, as a social science-trained undergraduate embarking on law
study, I was constantly surprised to see how often empirical state-
ments served as the basis or justification for legal rulings, or for pred-
ictions about human behavior and compliance with the law, and how
seldom such claims were substantiated by rigorous empirical study.
How seldom did law seem to be informed by what, as a sociology
student, I had labeled a "Durkheimian epiphany"-a manifestation
of an almost "divine" ordering of things by human social patterns. I
imagine the moment of insight when Emile Durkheim, poring over
statistics in his study of suicide, 9 recognized the "social facts" of the
occurrence of suicide-patterns that were clear and in some cases
quite counterintuitive. Suicide rates were higher for single men than
married men and lower for single women than married women, 10 al-
lowing Durkheim, in seeking explanation, to tell a tale of the gendered
nature of the family experience that is remarkably robust to this day.
He interpreted this data to suggest that the needs of men were better
served and satisfied within the family, with a wife to support and care
for such needs, while women were more likely to feel oppressed and
depressed within the burdens of family life." Thus, in the words of
Berger and Luckmann, Durkheim's observations built on both "ob-
jective facticity" and "subjective meaning.' ' 2 The story told was one
of social explanation derived from numbers. Indeed, as sociologist
Randall Collins points out, to illustrate the importance of exploring
the relationship of explanation to data in modern sociology, even
WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984); West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice:
The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99
HARv. L. REv. 384 (1985); West, Law & Literature, and the Celebration of Authority (Book
Review), 83 Nw. U.L. Rav. 977 (1989).
9. E. DuRKHrn, SUICIDE (1951).
10. Id. at 171-202 (see especially pages 188-89). The analysis of variations in suicide rates is
actually quite sophisticated, describing the operations of a variety of differences in rates having
to do with families with children and those without. Durkheim tells a story of variation within
the conjugal family (husband-wife) and family groups (with children) and also traces variations
by class and region.
11. Id.
12. P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALrrY: A TREATISE ON
TF[E SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 18 (1966).
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"mathematics is always embedded in words," 13 providing what can be
called a "discursive positivism."
In the years since scholars first began trying to understand the vari-
ables that affect "legal behavior," similar "social facts" have been
uncovered in some areas of socio-legal inquiry. While lawyers as-
sumed (or at least acted on the assumption) that if they legislated or
litigated, the rest of the world would follow, social scientists looking
at legal phenomena uncovered the variability, contextuality, and com-
plexity of expressions and behavioral manifestations of the law. In my
view, the name "legal realist" is apt because the realists were more
realistic about the causality and determinacy of law; they were slightly
more skeptical about law, or at least they understood that other social
relations would mediate the effects of rules and commands. Thus,
from my own experience, I found the moments of Durkheimian or
sociological "epiphanies' '1 4 in the law more interesting and more true
to experience than the arid claims of legal doctrine alone. After all,
Brown v. Board of Education" had been decided, but the schools
were not integrated, so clearly the law was not simply followed.' 6 The
effort to understand why and when law is followed and when it is not
could be termed an instrumental project of the liberal legalists, as de-
scribed by Trubek. For those who thought that law could effect social
and political change, it was important to understand when it did and
under what circumstances, and when it did not. Thus, from the begin-
ning and from my perspective (a whole generation later in law and
society terms 7), the social study of legal phenomena was, in Trubek's
terms, "critical empiricism" and in mine, "engaged research," in that
the research was committed to particular social and political goals,
even if also committed to conventional positivist social science meth-
ods.Law is a human artifact. It is made by some people, enforced by
other people, as it acts upon yet other people.18 Thus, attempts to un-
13. Collins, Sociology: Proscience or Antiscience?, 54 AM. Soc. REv. 124, 128 (1989).
14. It may seem somewhat ironic to use a religious term to describe an experience of "scien-
tific knowledge," but for us twentieth-century non-believers or agnostics, knowledge revealed
can be as dramatic as a moment of spiritual enlightenment.
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that separate but equal education for blacks and whites is
unconstitutional).
16. As "gap" studies explored the gaps between the law on the books and the law in action,
another area of research in socio-lega studies became known as "impact" studies, tracing the
impact Supreme Court decisions in particular have or do not have on the behaviors they are
supposed to affect. See generally THE IMPACT OF SUPREM CoURT DECISiONS (T. Becker ed.
1968).
17. In "real" years this is not very long. I attended my first Law & Society meeting in the
late 1970's.
18. Actually, as many legal feminists have argued, for most of human history law has been
1990]
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derstand why laws turn out to be the way they are, when they are
obeyed and when not, and in which particular periods of time and in
what places, became a behavioral social science, but one that was
committed to particular legal and social questions. As Trubek notes,
an analysis of the first five years' issues of the Law and Society Re-
view reveals that most of the articles were committed to the law and
social change projects of the 1960's: civil rights and civil liberties,
Warren Court decisions, and Great Society programs involving wel-
fare law, urban renewal, and legal services for the poor. Other issues
of liberal legal reform also were covered, such as the insanity defense
and child custody; also evidenced were efforts to spread information
about socio-legal research and its scientific methods. 9 So, from the
beginning, efforts to understand the social construction of legal issues
and the ways in which the new rules of the 1960's were or were not
affecting social problems was a large part of the early socio-legal re-
search agenda. Although Trubek may label these as "liberal legal-
isms" through the lens of 1990's politics, in the 1960's these legal and
social reform projects (particularly in the War on Poverty) were seri-
ous political efforts to bring about social change. Socio-legal research
was one of the arms of a larger social movement.20 The current vogue
of critiquing law and society research as "policy science' '2 enfolds the
cynicism that social reformers now feel about government policies and
programs into the historical telling. This engrafts a 1980's cynicism
and skepticism onto the efforts of the 1960's, when there was hope in
the land that government policies and programs might be effective,
made and enforced by men, yet has acted on men and women. See generally Menkel-Meadow,
Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the Law, 42 U.
MIA L. REv. 29 (1987); Rifkin, Toward A Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3 HARv. WOMEN'S
L.J. 83 (1980). Similarly, critical race theorists have focused on how laws created by white peo-
ple have been used to define the legal existence of non-white peoples. See generally Crenshaw,
supra note 3.
19. Trubek, supra note 2, at 38 n.76.
20. In one of his earlier pieces in this series, Trubek seems a bit more willing to describe the
early years of Law and Society as a political project, albeit one that failed, largely because the
government policies "failed." Trubek & Esser, "Critical Empiricism" in American Legal Stud-
ies: Paradox, Program, or Pandora's Box?, 14 LAw AND Soc. INQUIRY 3 (1989). Without bela-
boring the analogy, one can see that many of our modern social movements have a parallel
development in academe. Women's studies in the universities is an outgrowth of the social move-
ment of feminism. See generally E. DuBois, G. Kelly, E. Kennedy, C. Korsmeyer & L. Robin-
son, FEMINIST SCHOLARSHIP: KINDLINO IN THmE GROVES OF AcADEmE (1985). Critical Legal Studies
is the academic arm of the radical left of the 1960's and 1970's, and critical race scholars can
trace their origins to the civil rights movement. From my own personal history, I would add the
connections of clinical legal education to the anti-poverty legal services movement of the 1960's
and 1970's as well. This is not to say that all academic "schools" of thought can find analogues
in social movements, but the more progressive ones certainly can.
21. See Trubek & Esser, supra note 20, at 16; see generally Sarat & Silbey, supra note 2.
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and when social science was one of many instruments for affecting the
system, if not for measuring the effects of other forces of social and
legal change.
A brief look at some other examples of "Durkheimian epiphanies"
in socio-legal research may illustrate the significance of those mo-
ments of understanding the patterns of legal behavior, patterns that
illustrate how law operates and how law can and cannot be used to
effectuate change. As discussed by others before me, 22 The American
Jury23 was significant not only because it was one of the first efforts to
systematically apply social science techniques to the study of legal in-
stitutions, but because of the substantive findings relating to the ex-
tent of agreement and disagreement between judge and jury verdicts.
This work represents the culmination of many "Durkheimian epipha-
nies." These discoveries continue to shape our thinking about fact
finding, small group behavior, and important policy questions-such
as the competency of lay jurors in cases requiring technical expertise.
This study (actually a series of studies) began what is now a major
area of research-jury behavior24-that continues to influence policy
and practical decisions made by lawyers in particular cases. 25 Indeed,
The American Jury study may be one that is particularly ripe for rep-
lication in the near future. Its applicability to present times in a multi-
cultural environment, where crime and big business scams appear to
be on the rise, could be tested. The study's comparisons between civil
and criminal trials could be elaborated, different methods could be
used, and variations on the fact finding process-such as the summary
jury trial26-could be tested. From this study we have learned, among
other things, that the social location of fact-finders in the legal system
might influence the judgments they make: Do judges who hear hun-
dreds of criminal trials have different assumptions about guilt than
those who are new players in the system and are schooled in the "pre-
sumption of innocence"? The American Jury study also poses ques-
tions of social science interpretation that have great relevance to us
today. For example, at what point do divergences between judges and
juries matter? Is a ten percent divergence of opinion a concern suffi-
22. See generally Levine, supra note 1.
23. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMaCicA JuRY (1966).
24. See generally V. HANs & N. Vtm , JuDGiNo THE JuRy (1986).
25. My own experience with THE AM ERcAN JuRy, supra note 23, was both scholarly, as a
new socio-legal scholar and student, and practical. I read it at a time when I was making my first
decision as a lawyer about whether to demand a jury in a criminal matter.,
26. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Means of Dispute Resolu-
tion: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on the Operation of
the Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1984).
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cient to affect constitutional decision-making about juries, or is a
ninety percent overlap of fact-finding so similar that we can dispense
with juries? Such findings in turn present us with important issues
about how to make such judgments: to what standards of "proof"
should we hold ourselves, and how do we integrate the different "evi-
dentiary requirements" of different disciplines? Should constitutional
decisions about the "right to a jury trial" turn on social science corre-
lations of convergence in judge-jury fact-finding? Can legal decision-
making incorporate more equivocal social science findings than the
"certainty" or "preponderance of the evidence" required by legal
standards?
Other "Durkheimian epiphanies" in law have revealed more com-
plex social patterning. From the important death penalty research
conducted by David Baldus and his collaborators,27 we have learned
that "simple" race discrimination does not determine the meting out
of capital punishment, but rather a more complicated relationship be-
tween the race of the victim and the race of the defendant has an im-
pact on death penalty decisions.
Significant social scientific study of the legal profession has con-
firmed what many of us know from experience-that the practice of
law is highly stratified and segmented; it can hardly be considered a
unitary profession. 28 We have also learned that the practices of law-
yers, including ethical decisions and the principles lawyers use to re-
solve moral dilemmas, will vary depending on their social location. 29
Popular images of the lawyer reflect this complex and changing socio-
27. See generally Baldus, Pulaski & Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death Sentences:
An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. Cgim. L. & CR1nNOLOGY 661 (1983); Bal-
dus, Pulaski, Woodworth, & Kyle, Identifying Comparatively Excessive Sentences of Death: A
Quantitative Approach, 33 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1980);. Gross & Mauro, Patterns of Death: An
Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L.
REv. 27 (1984). Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not find this work sufficiently persuasive
to affect its ruling, temporarily closing another chapter in the impact of social science on law-
making story. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (finding that a study that the death
penalty in Georgia was imposed more often on black defendants and killers of white victims
failed to show a discriminatory purpose in this case and did not indicate a constitutionally signif-
icant risk of racial bias). See generally W. Lot, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL. PROCESS
(1984).
28. R. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989); J. HEINZ & E. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS:
THE SOCIAL STRUCT-RE OF THE BAR (1982); Ladinsky, Careers of Lawyers, Law Practice, and
Legal Institutions, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 47 (1963); Ladinsky, The Impact of Social Backgrounds of
Lawyers on Law Practice and the Law, 16 J. LEGAL EDUC. 127 (1963).
29. See generally J. CARLn, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN: A STUDY OF INDIVDUAL PRACTI
TIONERS IN CHICAGO (1962); J. HANDLER, Tim LAWYER AND His COMMUNITY: Tim PRACTICING
BAR IN A MIDDLE-SIZED CITY (1967); Nelson, Ideology, Practice, and Professional Autonomy:
Social Values and Client Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REv. 503 (1985).
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logical reality. If the idealized normative lawyer was the fatherly small
town solo practitioner in the nineteenth century, he was replaced in
turn by the gentlemanly but rapacious railroad lawyer of the late nine-
teenth century, the elite corporate lawyer of the early twentieth cen-
tury, the crusading individual rights litigator and orator, the steely
government lawyer, and now the marauding "M and A" lawyer.30
Through my recent work on women in the legal profession, I have
experienced my own "Durkheimian epiphany." In examining data on
the participation of women in the legal profession in twenty nations
(mostly the modern western democracies, with some representation
from Latin America and Asia), I found that women were performing
all lawyering tasks when these tasks, throughout the nations, were ag-
gregated. But if one looked at particular countries or particular legal
cultures, women were uniformly over-represented among the lower
paid and less prestigious areas of practice, however a particular coun-
try or legal culture valued legal work. Thus, in countries where litiga-
tion is highly valued, women are office functionaries; in countries
(like ours) where corporate deal-making has reached the top of the
money and prestige scales, women are more likely to be litigators.
And in virtually all nations, women are more likely to be found in the
public sector, where civil service rules are more likely to reflect anti-
30. "M" and "A" refer, respectively, to mergers and acquisitions. See generally Gordon,
"The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasies and Practices of New York City Lawyers,
1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51 (G. Gawalt ed.
1984); Chase, Lawyers and Popular Culture: A Review of Mass Media Portrayals of American
Attorneys, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 281. Each of these images of lawyers has parallel de-
scriptions in the empirical work on lawyers and in popular culture treatments of lawyers in film,
novels, and television. Contrast the most recent glossy television images of the private firm law-
yers of L.A. Law with the true grit of the prosecutors of Equal Justice. I cannot resist pointing
out that 1990's popular culture seems to be glamorizing "the other side" of lawyers-private,
corporate lawyers in big firms and prosecutors-while earlier (1960's) images were more likely to
be of the independent "crusading" Clarence Darrow, Atticus Finch types, such as Perry Mason
and The Defenders. Change in the "center" of empirical inquiry parallels this shift. People who
formerly studied legal services lawyers and other "underdog" lawyers have now flocked to the
study of the big firm lawyer. See generally Symposium: The Growth of Large Law Firms and Its
Effect on the Legal Profession and Legal Education, 64 IND. L.J. 423 (1989) (including Fried-
man, Gordon, Pirie & Whatley, Law, Lawyers, and Legal Practice in Silicon Valley: A Prelimi-
nary Report, 64 IND. L.J. 555 (1989); Garth, Legal Education and Large Firms: Delivering
Legality or Solving Problems, 64 IND. L.J. 433 (1989)); the recent work of Marc Galanter, for
example Galanter & Palay, The Transformation of the Large Law Firm (a paper delivered to the
American Bar Foundation Conference on Professionalism, Ethics, and Economic Change (Sep-
tember 1988)) (preliminary version on file at Florida State Archives). Have both the popular
media and scholars been captured by the same "political" and cultural forces of 1980's Reagan-
ism?
Here is one site where socio-legal study demands the kind of critical judgment it receives
from Trubek. He and I are most in agreement about wanting socio-legal scholars to bear some
self-consciousness and responsibility for the sites and effects of their work.
1990]
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discriminatory norms. 31 Thus, the "Durkheimian epiphany" of the so-
cial patterning of occupational segregation illustrates the interactions
of law and society and the women actors who have tried to move from
one sphere to another. Yet, these "social facts" are even more inter-
esting because the discovered patterns also enable us to see that one
way we can measure the relative desirability of a particular legal occu-
pation is simply to look at where the women are. 32 The result is that
we have uncovered one social pattern to watch-to see if it changes; at
the same time, we may have uncovered another "variable" to use to
decode other social phenomena, such as what constitutes less valued
work. Thus, empirical work on the legal profession describes a far
more complex world in which who practices law may be as significant
as what law is practiced. This attention to who the legal actors are, in
an empirical rather than doctrinal sense, describes the operation of the
legal system in a far more accurate way than simple studies of what
the law is could ever do.
Other examples of the social patterning of legal behavior abound.
Indeed, many of them come from Trubek's own colleagues. Stewart
Macaulay's important empirical works demonstrated that business-
men resorted less often to law than to relationship in resolving con-
tract disputes, 33 and that lawyers also failed to use law in resolving
consumer disputes, in part because they were ignorant of the law and
in part because they preferred less adversarial methods of resolving
"small" disputes. 34 Marc Galanter's now classic work35 reported that
"repeat players" in the legal system were likely to fare better because
of their experience with the system and because of the greater re-
sources available for mobilization among the "haves" of our soci-
ety. 36 As legal scholars and actors, we have learned important lessons
from this work: Who is legally "right" may not matter as much as
who is not only "street smart" in Trubek's words, but also "court-
smart." The significance of these studies, even if underappreciated by
31. Menkel-Meadow, Feminization of the Legal Profession: The Comparative Sociology of
Women Lawyers, in LAWYERS IN Soci aTY: ComPARATrE THEoRus 196 (R. Abel & P. Lewis eds.
1989); Menkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda of the Feminization of the Legal Profes-
sion: Theories of Gender and Social Change, 14 LAW & Soc. INQtnRY 289 (1989) [hereinafter
Research Agenda].
32. Much, though not all, of what is said here about women also applies to other "ex-
cluded" groups. See generally Menkel-Meadow, supra note 18.
33. Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55, 58 (1963).
34. See generally Macaulay, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 115 (1979).
35. Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974).
36. Id.
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traditional legal scholars, is not lost on practicing lawyers, who share
a sort of "empirical"" understanding of how legal rules actually oper-
ate, as mediated by the actors and institutions that enact the rules and
practices of the law.
Similarly, in the criminal context, Malcolm Feeley's empirical
work3" in the lower courts demonstrates that the processing of cases
itself is experienced as "punishment"-rather than the expression of
our higher values of due process-to those who experience it.39 And in
a recent controversial book, 40 legal sociologist Jack Katz has argued
that crimes are committed for the emotional highs and thrills they give
the perpetrators, 4' thus posing a challenge to much of our legal policy
in crime prevention and punishment.
These examples are only a few of the many I could give of how
social patterning, revealed by rigorous empirical research and creative
interpretation, demonstrates the problematic aspects of the operation
of law and legal institutions. I do not wish to make an argument here
for crass positivism, but I fear the critique of the politics of positiv-
ism, a critique which I share with Trubek, may cut too broad a swath
through the thicket of what empirical research has told us about law.
Below, I will explore my commonalities with Trubek's insistence that
we look at the sources of our questions and research designs, consider
the possible effects of our research, and claim some responsibility for
the research that is conducted under the name of socio-legal studies.
At this point, however, I want to be sure we do not go too far. Mo-
ments of seeing patterned social facts or "Durkheimian epiphanies"
are significant in our understanding of how the legal system operates;
we cannot abandon research that seeks to realize more of these mo-
ments.
Recognizing that virtually all of the works discussed above reveal a
"critical empiricism" (with a small "c," if not a capital "C") is also
important. Research questions are framed and data pursued because
the researcher is critical of the received wisdom or common concep-
tions of the field and its issues. The studies I have sought to highlight
do not "document the obvious" or "demonstrate that common sense
is true," often-heard derogatory statements about what social science
37. Here I use empirical in the "experiential" sense of the term. For further elaboration of
the definitional issues implicated in the differences between empirical method and empiricism as
a philosophy. of knowledge, see Interpretation in Sociolegal Research: A Review Section Debate,
15 LAW & SoC. INQUIRY 135 (1990).
38. M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT (1979).
39. Id.
40. See generally J. KATZ, THE SEDUCTIONS OF CRIME (1988).
41. Id.
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does. These studies criticize what we may think is true by showing us
that our understandings are too simplistic or that there are "underly-
ing" forces beneath the obvious social patterning that explain more,
or cause us to question our "common understandings. ' 42 In this
sense, "Durkheimian epiphanies" are "Critical empiricism" (Critical
with a capital "C") when they challenge what we already know-the
politics may not always lead in one direction. 43 And here my major
point is that we must be careful about going "Back to the Future"
when what that leads to is 1990's interpretations of 1960's scholarship
and events that had different meanings-including their political
ones-at the time. An historian must always interpret the past from
his or her present perspective, but a good historian also must take
heed of the context in which the past was enacted.
II. SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES BEYOND "DuRKHEInIAN EPIPHANIES:" OF
"TRANSDISCIPLINARY" KNOWLEDGE
Socio-legal studies is important not only because it reveals the par-
ticular social patterns ,of legally structured behavior. On the levels of
method, object of study, and theory, socio-legal studies also has inde-
pendent significance because of what it asks us to look at and how we
study the material. Socio-legal studies has taught those interested in
law to look at "texts" other than statutes or cases. 44 Social science
work about the operation of law exposed the interaction of law and
those it acts upon in the lower courts, 45 rather than only exposing the
doctrine of the Supreme Court; it exposed too the operation of law in
42. Indeed, one of the most interesting and robust areas of sociological inquiry is the study
of the patterns of everyday life. These studies help us understand how what we take for granted
came to be part of the "given" and unquestioned nature of things. They also complicate the easy
acceptance of some of these "common understandings." See the discussion of the contributions
of ethnomethodology in D. SMrr, Tim EVERYDAY WORLD AS PROBLEMATIC: A FEMINIST SOCIOL-
OgY (1987) and in Collins, supra note 13.
43. Let there be no mistake about it, this is not a statement critical of Critical Legal Stud-
ies, of which I am a card-carrying member. I merely wish to broaden the sense in which socio-
legal studies may be critical without necessarily being politically left. I see Jack Katz' work on
criminality, supra note 40, as an example of this kind of work. His work has inspired reaction
from those on both the left and the right, exemplified by an Author Meets the Critics discussion
at the Law and Society Annual Meeting in June, 1989. There also has been room for small "c"
criticism within Critical Legal Studies, of which Trubek's own Where the Action Is: Critical
Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REv. 575 (1984), is one of the best examples.
In one sense, Critical Legal Studies could be faulted for "documenting the obvious." Try asking
any person on the street whom the law protects and one is likely to get an answer close to "the
rich" or "the powerful." The person on the street already knows what critical scholars are try-
ing to prove to the rest of legal academe.
44. For a fuller and more eloquent discussion of how law has turned outward to meet other
disciplines, see Minow, Law Turning Outward, 73 TELos 79 (1987).
45. See, e.g., M. FEELEY, supra note 38.
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other settings, such as the law office,46 the clerk's office, 47 and the
streets, 48 as it often turned the focus on other actors-clerks, lawyers,
police, mediators-rather than simply on judges or legislators. Thus,
socio-legal studies takes us out of the law books, particularly the ap-
pellate law books, and into those places where law is actually experi-
enced.
Socio-legal studies is not alone in telling us that the action is not in
the law books. If a thorough intellectual history of socio-legal studies
is to be done, it must examine the connections of the "law and soci-
ety" idea to the other "law and . . ." ideas with which it coexists. I
will only sketch those here, but as someone who considers herself a
"multiple marginal" by working in a number of these areas, I do
want to address some of the common themes that unite those who
seek to explain legal phenomena by other than self-referential legal
"science." The most significant legal movements that challenge legal
doctrine include law and literary analysis (somewhat different from
the study of law and literature itself),49 Critical Legal Studies, clinical
legal education, law and humanism, feminist legal studies, and law
and economics.5 0
Although in one sense law and literary analysis shares the most
common frameworks with traditional legal analysis-in that it focuses
on the text as subject and employs not dissimilar methods of
interpretation' I-literary analysis does suggest that there are meanings
46. See generally Cain, The General Practice Lawyer and the Client: Towards a Radical
Conception, 7 INT'L J. Soc. L. 331 (1979); Sarat & Felstiner, Legal Realism in Lawyer-Client
Communications, AaaucAN BAR FOUNDATION WORKING PAPER # 8723 (1989).
47. Yngvesson, Making Law at the Doorway: The Clerk, the Court, and the Construction
of Community in a New England Town, 22 LAW & Soc'y Rav. 409 (1988); See generally Merry,
Everyday Understandings of the Law in Working-Class America, 13 Am. ETHNOLOGIST 253
(1986).
48. See generally Katz, supra note 40.
49. Contrast R. POSNER, supra note 8, R. WEISBERO, supra note 8, and West, supra note 8,
with Dalton, supra note 8, and Frug, Re-reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts
Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 1065 (1985) (Dalton and Frug use literary methods to critique
legal texts, as contrasted with studies of the use of law in literary texts.).
50. There are others (see AALS list of Sections, including law and community, law and
medicine, law and science), but the ones in the text all share a direct challenge to both the teach-
ing and method of doctrinal analysis.
51. I was struck as a beginning law student by the similarities between reading a case and
reading a poem by one of the modernists like Ezra Pound or T.S. Eliot. The words were filled
with layers of meaning and conjured up allusions to past worlds and symbols that needed both
simple definition and translation (there was much Latin in both), as well as a good background
in history. More recently, the schools of deconstruction and structuralism have been used to help
in both the decoding and encoding of texts. The difference between poetry and law cases was
that law cases began to resemble each other after awhile, while poems contained more of the
artistry of individual poets and more of the beauty of the variety of life. See sources in note 49,
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embedded in the text that must be teased out. It also suggests that the
text bears a relationship to the context in which it is read and to the
person who reads it, that moves us outside of the text to the writers
and readers of the cases. Most important for my purposes, literary
analysis (not legal analysis) reminds us that words need interpretation
and that they are not self-executing and "real" in the sense that Lang-
dellian legal "science" would see them as "rules" of human behavior.
To the extent that law creates several genres in the forms of cases,
statutes, administrative regulations, and opinions,5 2 literary analysis
may help us less with the "collective" form of writing done by legisla-
tures and agencies, but it does remind us not to take doctrine as
dogma, thus moving us away from "classical" treatments of legal
texts."
Others, including Trubek and myself, see the law and economics
movement as having the closest affinity to traditional legal "science."
The movement seeks to substitute another body of scientific rules and
normative principles (like efficiency) for the failure of legal principles
to easily predict behavior and guide decisions. In my view, law and
economics has gained greater acceptance in legal scholarship and prac-
tice not necessarily because its rules are any better at predicting behav-
ior, but because there is more normative agreement among scholars
and practitioners than exists in many other "law and" fields.14 It is
also no accident that, to the extent that each of these schools of
thought is based in a "critical" ideology (I am arguing that they all
are), law and economics has gained relative ascendancy at a time when
its market ideology is reflected in both national politics and policy.
Nevertheless, I still see the law and economics movement as an intel-
lectual discipline that shares some affinities with the other schools-it
does challenge and reveal the indeterminacy of doctrine in much the
same way as Critical Legal Studies does (if from the other side of the
supra, for some of the debates in literary analysis of texts involving law; for a sense of the flavor
of the literary interpretation debate in law, see, for example, Fish, Fish v. FisS, 36 STAN. L. REv.
1325 (1984), and Symposium: Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1985). For an amusing and
delightful satire of the various schools of literary criticism (and the silliness of academic life in
general), see the fictional work of David Lodge, especially D. LODGE, NICE WORK: A NOVEL
(1989) and D. Lodge, SMALL WORL (1984).
52. And like literary analysis, legal analysis privileges some texts over others. We look at
legislative history in committee reports to determine legislative "intent," but we do not analyze
drafts of opinions to study the "intent" and political interplay of judges writing common law.
53. Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of
Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, in 3 RESEARCH IN LAW & SOCIOLOGY 3 (R. Si-
mon ed. 1980); Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1151 (1985).
54. Of course, it certainly helps to have the scholars become the practitioners, such as when
former Professors Scalia, Posner, and Easterbrook, among others, became judges. See generally
R. POSNER, TH ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
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political spectrum). It also sees human (if too rational for my taste)
actors in the legal system whose behavior must be explained (and can
be changed with the proper incentives-usually with payments or ap-
peals to efficiency). Additionally, some of the best work uses empiri-
cal methods to study the behavior of allegedly "rational" decision-
makers to explore how far the real is from the ideal." In theory, law
and economics may seem to promise the "certainty" of doctrines that
legal rules cannot deliver, but in fact much law and economics work
demonstrates just how far we are from having determinate systems of
rules that explain actual behavior.
In my view, also expressed in Trubek's earlier work,5 6 much of the
work of Critical Legal Studies looks most like traditional legal schol-
arship in its focus on the legal text-rules and cases. Many writers
have challenged critical legal scholars to broaden their work to empiri-
cal study.5' Yet the purpose of critical textual analysis is not to un-
cover the "scientific" universals expressed in the abstractions of legal
rules, but rather to demonstrate just how much a human artifact law
really is, and to develop and "prove" the claim that underlying power
relations structure the texts and their reading.5" At the level of intellec-
tual method, Critical Legal Studies has shown about law (what we
actually began to know from the Legal Realists) what Terry Eagleton
has said about literary theory (and which, in my mind, holds true for
all theory):
For any body of theory concerned with human meaning, value,
language, feeling and experience will inevitably engage with broader,
deeper beliefs about the nature of human individuals and societies,
problems of power and sexuality, interpretations of past history,
versions of the present and hopes for the future. It is not a matter of
regretting that this is so-of blaming [literary] (legal) theory for
being caught up with such questions. ... Such pure ... theory is an
academic myth .... [Tiheories are not to be upbraided for being
political, but for being on the whole covertly or unconsciously so-
for the blindness with which they offer as a supposedly "technical,"
"self-evident," "scientific" or "universal" truth doctrines which
with a little reflection can be seen to relate to and reinforce the
55. See generally Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in
Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986).
56. See Trubek, supra note 43, at 577.
57. See generally Munger & Seron, Critical Legal Studies Versus Critical Legal Theory: A
Comment on Method, 6 LAw & POL'Y Q. 257 (1984).
58. I will not cite all of the voluminous CLS literature here. For a good review, see M.
KELmAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIMES (1987); R. UNGER, TaI CarrIcAL LEGAL STUDIES
MOVEMENT (1986).
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particular interests of particular groups of people at particular
times. 59
Thus, without an empirical focus, Critical Legal Studies shares the
project of demonstrating the human interests (the power relations) of
those making law for their own purposes and thereby exposes the
myth of "scientific truth" in law.
In its brief and hardly noticed expression in some law schools, the
law and humanistic education movement: sought to express the hu-
man dimensions of law, lawyering, and learning by focusing on the
psychological and interpersonal dynamics of the expression of legal
principles and practice of law. Although he would not be considered a
member of this group, the work of John Noonan, in his book Persons
and Masks of the Law,6' represents one example of looking at the ef-
fects of lawmaking on the people involved in cases. In his treatment
of the famous Palsgraf case,62 Noonan explores the plight of Mrs. He-
len Palsgraf and the emotional and monetary costs of her injury, as
contrasted with Justice Cardozo's pursuit of his own political, eco-
nomic, and legal theory interests in crafting his famous words about
proximate causation. In combination with the contributions of clinical
education, such efforts to make real the human dimensions of law and
law practice are attempts to convey the empirical reality of law-in
both theory and learning-with appreciation for the individual's expe-
rience of law and legal institutions. 6
If law is learned through legal doctrine, then practice, where it is
taught at all, is taught through experience. Thus, the clinical educa-
tion movement has sought explicitly to bring the real world into the
law school and, in the words of Trubek- in another context-become
the "facts" department of the law school. I will say more about this
below when I explore the connections of socio-legal studies to legal
education. Here it is important to note that the focus of socio-legal
studies and clinical education is the same-to understand the legal
world that is-even if the knowledge will be put to different uses. The
59. T. EAaLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 195 (1983).
60. See generally E. DvoRKiN, J. H LnsTniN & H. LESNICK, BECOMING A LAwYER: A
HunuAsTic PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PRoFESSIoNALISM (1981); Himmelstein,
Reassessing. Law Schooling: An Inquiry into the Application of Humanistic Educational Psy-
chology to the Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U.L. REv. 514 (1978).
61. J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF T LAW (1976).
62. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
63. The new law school at CUNY-Queens was founded to express these concerns in an
innovative curriculum seeking to combine doctrinal, theoretical, and experiential learning for
"law in the service of human needs." Catalogue of City University of New York Law School at
Queens College 9 (1986-87).
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production of knowledge in legal clinics can be likened to a social sci-
ence "laboratory" where researchers and practitioners tease out ex-
actly those "gaps" in the law on the books and in the law as practiced
that must be understood to function in the legal system. Elsewhere, I
have lamented that no closer connection exists between the research of
socio-legal studies and the practice of law in academic clinical
settings64 that could lead to the kind of "engaged" practice and social
research I discuss below. Nevertheless, clinical education and socio-
legal studies share moments of "Durkheimian epiphanies" when they
reveal patterned moments of social truth in the ways that legally
"controlled" behavior diverges from the "given" rules.65
I use legal feminism as another school of thought (there are others,
such as critical race theory) that challenges the focus on the legal sys-
tem as a universal, abstract, objective, and neutral construct created
by particular actors. Some versions of feminist jurisprudence have ex-
pressed the broadest possible attack in describing the legal system as
an institution given to maintaining patriarchy, with little possibility of
expressing a legitimate order for us all. 6 In other claims, feminists
have argued that the law and its principal interpreters and actors do
not take account of women's experiences, and thus the formality of
the law does not reflect the reality of women's lives and is, therefore,
illegitimate and insufficiently helpful to women. 67 Again, I do not
have space here to explore the richness of feminist scholarship, but I
do want to explore two aspects of feminist thinking that have implica-
tions for our current subject. First, by focusing on a previously ex-
cluded group-women-legal feminism exposes the lack of truth in
the "neutral," "formal," and "objective" pronouncements of law.
Thus, in common with other movements, legal feminism tells us that
64. Dilemmas, supra note 4, at 296. For a persuasive argument that clinical education also
develops theories about lawyering, see Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An
Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L. Rsv. 577 (1987).
65. In a recent class that I taught on mediation, a mediator from the local family court
described the processes used in her court. Students were amazed to learn how much the described
"practice" diverged from what the statutes seemed to require. They could not really grasp that a
lack of resources restricted the ability of most clients to protest through formal legal appeals.
Such descriptions of how the law really operates in a clinical setting are much better understood
from the writings of rigorous socio-legal scholars than from any formal legal statutory scheme.
See generally Galanter, supra note 35; Greatbatch & Dingwall, Selective Facilitation: Some Pre-
liminary Observations on a Strategy Used by Divorce Mediators, 23 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 613
(1989); Silbey & Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW & POL'Y 7 (1986).
66. Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3 HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 83 (1980).
67. C. SMART, FEMI.SM AND THE POWER OF LAW (1989); Littleton, Feminist Jurisprudence:
The Difference Method Makes (Book Review), 41 STAN. L. REv. 751 (1989) (reviewing C.
MAcKiNroN, FEMINIsM UNMODIFIED (1987)); Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of
Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. Cm. L. F. 23.
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formal law cannot create its own hermetically sealed and complete
system of explanation. Law may not "cause" gender oppression, 6 but
its rules do not act neutrally on all human beings. To understand its
differential operation on women, we cannot simply look at the legal
text69 but must instead understand the social forces that undergird the
legal treatment of women. Secondly, the very exclusion of women has
led to a spate of scholarship and speculation about how both the sub-
stance and methods of inquiry of the study of law might be refigured
with new researchers and actors in the system. 70 I explore these episte-
mological issues in the next section.
What all of these intellectual movements share is a desire to have
"Durkheimian epiphanies" that are deeper and richer than a formalist
understanding that comes from arid analysis of legal doctrine and to
thereby create "transdisciplinary" knowledge about legal phenomena.
By transdisciplinary I mean more than the simple borrowing of meth-
ods or insights from another field to supplement our legal understand-
ings of law. Transdisciplinary work moves through the work of many
disciplines to achieve knowledge about a subject (like law) that is
deeply textured, rich in description and explanatory power, and "be-
yond" the claims of any one discipline. 71 In part, this work comes
from the critical attention paid to the deconstruction of both the law
part and the society part of socio-legal studies. Like Trubek, I think
that good critical socio-legal research and teaching must continue to
treat the boundaries of both law and society and their influences on
each other as problematic72 and continue to use the theories and meth-
ods of each discipline to "correct" and supplement the structured er-
rors or blindnesses that accompany any univocal description of social
phenomena.
68. Many think it does, see, e.g., Rifkin, supra note 66, at 84, and others think it certainly
facilitates gender oppression, see, e.g., C. MAcKiNNON, FEMINISM UNMODFIED (1987).
69. Although the legal texts of Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), and General Elec-
tric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (holding that differential treatment on the basis of preg-
nancy is not sex discrimination), may be text enough!
70. See generally Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARv. L. REv. 829 (1990); Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 18; Research Agenda, supra note 31.
71. In this sense, transdisciplinary is synthetic in a way that "cross" or "inter" disciplinary
work seldom is (one discipline usually still dominates in these two forms). This is one of the
critiques Trubek makes when he says law has been dominant in socio-legal studies. Another
version of the "transdisciplinary" story is to see the development of a whole new field. This I
take to be Felice Levine's approach to socio-legal studies. See supra note 1. The issue of what
constitutes a "field" is one that affects a number of new disciplines trying to use the methods
and theories of a variety of disciplines, like women's studies, communications, and ethnic stud-
ies.
72. See generally Silbey & Sarat, Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research, 21 LAW
& Soc'y REv. 165 (1987).
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All of the approaches to legal phenomena described here place an
emphasis on the human aspects of law-making, interpretation, and en-
forcement, and seek to understand where the patterns and "social
facts" are located. With the exception of law and economics, they
share an understanding that no one system of thought can totally ex-
plain legal phenomena, and that the method and object of study may
vary and thus provide a variety of insights.
They also share, to varying degrees, marginalization within the legal
academy, if not in the parent disciplines that spawned them. As I will
explore more fully below, I also believe these efforts to understand the
"social" and "experiential" aspects of law are all "critical," to use
Trubek's words, in part because they are all marginalized, but also
because they offer a political critique of legal formalism and doctrin-
alism.
The ways in which these intellectual movements open the legal text
and explore other dimensions of legal behavior is political in two
senses. First, by challenging the politics of legal formalism, each of
these movements exposes the "academic myth"-that there is some
legal truth to be found in the text of the law-and causes us to look
behind the law-to its makers and interpreters-to understand how it
really operates. This is the "academic" or "intellectual" political pro-
ject. Second, many of these intellectual movements have some connec-
tion to a social or political movement outside the legal academy. In
some cases, the intellectual movement may have preceded its real
world counterpart (i.e., American pragmatism and legal realism pre-
ceded New Deal reformism). In other cases, social movements pre-
ceded theory making (civil rights, feminism) 73 or came together at the
same time (clinical education is a product both of the anti-poverty
movement of the 1960's and the educational reforms of the same era
calling for "relevance" to social problems in the academy). 74 All of
these intellectual developments are situated in a particular time and
place in their relationships to events occurring both in and out of the
academy.
The perspective I share with Trubek is that all of these movements,
socio-legal studies in particular, need to be conscious of being in both
73. For rich discussion of the interplay between theory and practice in social movements,
see Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement,
61 N.Y.U.L. REv. 589 (1986). Some, including Schneider, would say that theory and social
movements inform each other and exist contemporaneously in times of social struggle. See gen-
erally J. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND
SOCIAL CHANGE (1978).
74. In my view this "movement" has been transformed into an instrumental educational
project for learning lawyering skills, thus becoming increasingly detached from its political
roots, but that is a subject for another essay.
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the intellectual and real world arenas. The movements need to have
"Durkheimian epiphanies" and self-consciousness about themselves
because the production of knowledge has political implications. For
this reason I now turn to some of the epistemological and political
questions implicated in the "law and society idea," both as a research
project and as a program of legal education.
III. "IF Du.KHEim WERE A WoMAN": SomE THOUGHTS ON THE
SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
When Durkheim did his studies of suicide, social science was trying
to emulate the methods and practice of natural science. In the nine-
teenth century, law too was considered a "science" -with neutral, ob-
jective, and universal principles. In law, the "scientific method" idea
never worked as well. Teasing principles out of cases was not quite the
same as conducting experiments or collecting social data. Yet, as Tru-
bek points out, a commitment still exists in many circles that some
"objective" knowable truth is out "there." The knowable consists of
a moral order-or in constitutional jargon, "fundamental inter-
ests"-that can be discerned without bias and that are important to us
all. Even when legal realism demonstrated some of the 'failure of this
conception, social or policy science was seen as yet another way of
reclaiming objectivity by the search for real-world truth to supplement
the law. 75
In Trubek's analysis, post-Realist lawyers who engaged in what he
calls "Imperial Law" combined a faith in the power and centrality of
law (as more fully developed to include a sort of crude "social science
cum policy science") with a renewed commitment to law as a "neu-
tral" force in society. They did this by serving as a mediating force
between what we think of as civil society, the state, and competing
interest groups. In this view, social science was necessary from an in-
strumentalist perspective to effectuate the goals of law in a more ac-
tivist state. In fact, as Trubek points out, this tale must necessarily be
more complicated-because if the Realists were New Deal legal activ-
ists and the post-Realist lawyers were 1960's legal activists, their use
of law and social science could hardly be called neutral. Each of these
periods of lawmaking was characterized by commitments to particular
values and goals-values and goals that were, in the examples of So-
cial Security and civil rights, significant departures from prior values
and policies.
75. See generally Trubek, supra note 2; Peller, supra note 53.
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Trubek describes several "ideal types" of social scientists engaged
in the study of law-the True Scientist, the Social Problem Solver,
and the Technician-and describes several types of lawyers-the Im-
perial Jurists and the Skeptical Pragmatists. Trubek calls this relation-
ship of law and social science a "marriage of convenience" in which
lawyers sought the certainty from social science they could not achieve
through doctrine, and social scientists sought access to power. In an-
other interesting turn of phrase, Trubek says "like royal mistresses in
earlier times, social scientists may have thought that by an alliance
with law they could exercise power behind the scenes. "76 1 want to
deconstruct a number of these ideas from a feminist perspective to
question some of the meanings that may lie within this text. My com-
ments here are directed both to Trubek's particular formulations of
the issues and also to the larger epistemological issues they raise.
First, the "marriage of convenience" described by Trubek seems to
encode a conventional conception of marriage, in which one partner
(in this case the more "male" law) dominates the other (the more "fe-
male" social science). Trubek tells a tale of social science in service to
law-note the "mistress" language. This further encodes a hierarchy
of fields-or at least a duality between them-gendered in the use of
Trubek's metaphors, that I think misconceives (no pun intended!) the
intentions of at least some parties to this relationship who saw it as
"transcending" disciplines to form a new field77 of inquiry. 78
What I do share with Trubek is a sense that both fields, separately
and together, however bound to form a "family," share some com-
mon assumptions about how knowledge is acquired, structured, and
distributed. 79 The quest for certainty, neutrality, and objectivity that
characterized both law and social science (and certainly the hybrid
"policy science" that funded much of the early work) has been
brought seriously to account in recent years, not only by recent work
in feminist epistemology,80 but also by similar challenges to received
76. See Trubek, supra note 2, at 26 n.50.
77. This story of transdisciplinary work is more consistent with the story of the Law and
Society movement told in Felice Levine's Presidential Address, supra note 1.
78. In the comment period following the Mason Ladd lecture on which these articles are
based, Trubek responded to these comments by suggesting that law and social science be granted
a divorce, with joint custody of the truth. While I criticize the marriage metaphor, I do not think
law and social science should be "divorced," and in my view they will have to share custody of
the truth with a number of other fields of study as elaborated in the text.
79. I have purposely avoided the use of the word "disseminated" here to put an end to
these inappropriately gendered metaphors.
80. See, e.g., FEMINIST RESEARCH METHODS: ExEmLARY READINGS IN Tm SOCIAL ScIENcES
(J. Nielsen ed. 1990); S. HARDING, FEMINISM AND METHODOLOGY: SOCIAL ScIENCE IssuEs (1987)
[hereinafter METHODOLOGY]; S. HARDING, THE SCIENCE QUESTION IN FEMINISM (1986) [hereinaf-
ter SCIENCE QUESTION].
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knowledge in virtually all of the major disciplines in the twentieth cen-
tury. These changes are inspired in part by the great critical theories
of our time-modernism, structuralism, deconstructionism, post-
structuralism, and post-modernism. 8' In literature, canonicity has
been challenged; 2 in history, periodicity has been challenged. s3 Even
in science, objectivity and neutrality have been challenged 4 by those
who have argued that the relationship of the scientist to the object of
study is not as distanced or neutral as our romanticization of the sci-
entific method would have it appear.
In short, scientists of all disciplines are rooted in their own times
and spaces, with given genders, races, ethnicities, politics, and per-
sonal histories-or, these days, "personal narratives." These charac-
teristics and experiences of the scientists affect the choices of subject
for study, the methods of conducting the studies, and the methodol-
ogy (or theory) of research.
To return for a moment to Durkheim, these observations about
how knowledge is socially constructed ask us to consider the extent to
which the social patterns we see in the data are the products of who
we are and what we want to see. I chose Durkheim's study of suicide
because I think it demonstrates the ability to glimpse a "transcended"
knowledge. His story of women's experience of family life is remarka-
bly acute (and I might add, feminist!), and knowledge is not limited
entirely to a shared experience of the studied.85 Yet, in looking at the
work of another sociologist, Talcott Parsons," and the structuralist-
functionalist school in general, we now see that the pattern variables
that assigned instrumental roles to men and affective roles to women
were the product both of a conservative view of society and perhaps a
justification or defense of the status quo of the 1950's and 1960's in
which the work was written. Trubek illustrates well how this same
81. For some basic introductions to these theories, see E. KURZWEI, THE AGE OF STRUC-
TuRALIsM: LEvI-STRAUSS TO FOUCAULT (1980); T. EAGLETON, supra note 59; Flax, Postmodern-
ism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory, 12 SIGNS 621 (1987); Hawkesworth, Knowers,
Knowing, Known: Feminist Theory and Claims of Truth, 14 SIGNS 533 (1989).
82. A. KRUPAT, THE VOICE IN THE MARGIN: NATIVE AMERIucAN LITERATURE AD Tm
CANON (1989).
83. Kelly-Gadol, Did Women Have a Renaissance?, in BEcoMING VIIBE: WomEN n. Euto-
PEAN HISTORY 137 (1977); J.W. SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY (1988).
84. See generally R. BLIER, SCIENCE AND GENDER: A CRITIQUE OF BIOLOGY AND ITS THEo-
RIES ON WommN (1984); SCIENCE QUESTION, supra note 80; E. F. KELLER, REFLECTIONS ON GEN-
DER AND SCIENCE (1985).
85. For a sensitive critique of the dangers of overtly gendered research methods, see Peplau
& Conrad, Beyond Nonsexist Research: The Perils of Feminist Methods in Psychology, 13 PsY-
CHOLOGY OF WOMEN Q. 379 (1989).
86. T. PARSONS & E. Sms, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF ACTION (1951); T. PARSONs,
THE SOCIAL SYsTEM (1951).
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school operated to justify a totalizing theory of systematicity for the
entire social system, including the legal domain, by focusing on pat-
tern maintenance and the preservation of the social system. s7 Like
feminist epistemologists who have linked the study of particular sci-
ence questions to male gender, 8 or literary theorists who have linked
the study of particular texts89 to particular male interests, 9° Trubek
links the early social science studies of law to the particular interests
of those conducting the work-legitimacy, access to government, pol-
icy, and funding.
In my view, one of the major intellectual contributions of the twen-
tieth century is the parallel development in a wide variety of fields of
the recognition that social life cannot be detached from social study or
science, and that our knowledge is all socially constructed and vli-
dated. Thus, as in other disciplines, we in law and social science have
learned that law does not permit, in Trubek's words, a "univocal"
understanding of universal moral imperatives, and social science can-
not give us an objective description of the social institutions in which
law is made and enforced. 91
To take seriously the claims of feminist epistemologists and others
working on modern critiques of the theory of knowledge, we need to
acknowledge the relationship of the researcher to the subject (whether
"engaged" or distanced) .92 Additionally, we must consider the selec-
tion of research questions and framing of issues, the role of personal
experience as "truth, ' 93 the partiality or perspectivity of truth, 94 the
87. Trubek, supra note 2, at 31-33.
88. See generally E.F. KEJLER, supra note 84.
89. In academic circles these are called the DWEM texts-Dead White European Male
texts.
90. See generally C. HEILURUN, WRITING A WOMAN's Ln (1988); Heilbrun & Resnik, Con-
vergences: Law, Literature and Feminism, 99 YALE L.J. 1913 (1990).
91. For an argument about the relatively timeless validity of some "objective" social truths,
despite recent meta-theoretical critiques of social science, see Collins, Sociology: Proscience or
Antiscience?, 54 Am. Soc. REv. 124 (1989).
92. For an interesting discussion of how problematic "engaged" feminist ethnomethodol-
ogy may become, see Stacey, Can There Be A Feminist Ethnography?, 11 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L
F. 21 (1988).
93. This particular form of feminist knowing-based in part on consciousness raising-
while "empirical" in the experiential sense, raises issues of validation. See C. MACKINNON, To-
wARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 102 (1989); Bartlett, supra note 70, at 864.
94. Feminist theorists have learned well the lesson of creating theories out of situated expe-
riences. Much feminist theory is embedded in while middle class experience. See generally C.
STEEDMAN, LANDSCAPE FOR A GOOD WOMAN: A STORY OF Two LIvEs (1987) (exposing the class
bias in much feminist thought); E. SPELMAN, INEssENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN
FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988); Collins, The Social Construction of Black Feminist Thought, 14
SIGNS 745 (1989) (Spelman and Collins review both the absence and contributions of the black
feminist perspective.); Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U. Cm. L. F. 115 [hereinafter Univer-
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use of language and metaphor in our descriptions of what we know, 9
and skepticism about whether methods of validation are possible in a
post-modern world. These concerns have led to the identification of
three analytic feminist epistemological positions-feminist empiricism
(knowing from observations of experience, corrected for misogynist
bias), 96 feminist standpoint (knowing derived from oppressed or ex-
cluded status that is superior to top-down knowledge), or post-mod-
ern epistemology (skepticism about whether any truth or unitary
system of validation is possible).97
For me, the contribution of feminist epistemology and similar
claims derived from critical race theory98 is the exposure at the level of
ideas and theory of what exclusion means. This is in addition to the
substantive claims about exclusion from being the known or becoming
a knower and the inaccuracies in our knowledge that such exclusions
present. Thus, particular exclusions are both real (in that particular
subjects and objects of research are excluded) and ideal (in the sense
that they reveal the incompleteness and inaccuracy of our paradigms
and offer the possibility of new ones). 99
At the "ideal" or meta-level, such epistemological critiques of sci-
ence and social science remind us to view our research and our "Dur-
kheimian epiphanies" with some skepticism. In what political
commitments or engagements is our work rooted? What has been left
out? How would other researchers look at the questions and at the
answers? At the same time, and most important for present purposes,
feminist epistemology does acknowledge its rootedness in particular
political issues. Feminism as an academic subject of inquiry emerged
at a particular point to address particular issues, both in the world
and in academe. In that sense it unabashedly-if still somewhat prob-
sality]; Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEAL EDUC. 47 (1988) (Minow
suggests in both articles that feminists try to avoid the universal generalizations of masculinist
thought.).
95. Consider the polarized binary oppositions set up in most scientific inquiry. Notice the
use of competition and sports metaphors in such subjects as evolution and cell biology, such as
"survival of the fittest," "winning the battle for survival," and "achieving the biological goal."
E. KELLER, REFLECTIONS ON GENDER AND SCIENCE (1985).
96. See generally M. EICHLER, NoN-SEXIST RESEARCH METHODS (1988).
97. These different perspectives are elaborated more completely in METHODOLOGY, supra
note 80; Alcoff, Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist
Theory, 13 SIGNS 405 (1988); Bartlett, supra note 70; Harding, The Instability of the Analytic
Categories of Feminist Theory, II SIGNS 645 (1986); Hawkesworth, supra note 81; and Hek-
man, Comment on Hawkesworth's "Knowers, Knowing, Known: Feminist Theory and Claims
of Truth", 15 SIGNS 417 (1990).
98. See generally HARDING, SCIENCE FOR THE FEw? NEW FEMINIST ISSUES (forthcoming,
Cornell U. Press, 1991), and Crenshaw, supra note 3.
99. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
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lematically-confronts its engagement with particular social issues to
study"00 and its more complicated theoretical project of determining if
there really is a "women's way of knowing." 10' Despite Trubek's la-
beling of feminism's contribution to socio-legal studies as a "system-
atic" and structural account of law as a patriarchal system, I think
one of the more significant contributions of feminist legal theory to
socio-legal studies has been the feminist elaboration of partiality, po-
sitionality, 0 2 and political constructions of knowledge. This is a per-
spective which socio-legal studies would do well to listen to,
particularly in the current debates between positivism and interpretav-
ism in the parent disciplines of social science.0 3
IV. WHAT IS TO BE DONE? RECOGNIZING THE ENGAGEMENT OF SOCIO-
LEGAL STUDIES IN RESEARCH AND LEGAL EDUCATION
Trubek comes out of the other end of his critique of socio-legal
studies by suggesting that our original understandings of the "law and
society" idea no longer hold. I do not share completely his revision of
the past because, as I have said, I think it has gone back to the past
with the future in mind, criticizing early developments from a particu-
lar perspective in the present. Nevertheless, we share enough of a vi-
sion about the future, in a post-modern reconstruction of socio-legal
studies, that I hope we both come out of this discussion encouraging,
not dampening, this important form of social inquiry about law. I
would here like to briefly suggest some implications for socio-legal re-
search and legal education.
100. Consider, for example, the feminist concerns about the impact of divorce in L. WErrZ-
MAN, TiE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND EcoNoMIc CONSEQUENCES ON
WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMEICA (1985), and the gender issues in child custody in Fineman,
Dominant Discourse, Professional Language and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmak-
ing, 101 HARv. L. REv. 727 (1988).
101. See generally M. BELENKY, B. CLiNCHY, N. GOLDBERGER & J. TARULE, WOMEN'S WAYS
OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF, VOICE AND MND (1986); C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFER-
ENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN's DEVELOPMENT (1982).
102. This is Katherine Bartlett's phrase. Bartlett, supra note 70, at 832.
103. Some of these issues were confronted in a plenary session at the twenty-fifth anniver-
sary meeting of the Law & Society Association in Madison, Wisconsin, in June 1989.
Feminist critiques of dominant epistemologies are not the only forms of critiques, and feminist
critiques have their own many forms. See Collins, supra note 94. The irony of most critical
discussions of the "new" epistemology, however, is that while they claim to be based on particu-
lar experiences (particularly in their "standpoint" forms), the arguments for them are still con-
structed in abstract language that make claims about some general applicability. The next stage
in the epistemological discussion will have to take up how conflicting "experiences" -or at least
non-additive experiences-can be validated and used to construct some knowledge base with
applicability and relevance to more than the "experiencing" group. This also requires a critical
look at the essentialism embedded in many of the standpoint epistemologies.
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Trubek suggests that with our "new" understandings of the "fragil-
ity" of law we will be less chauvinistic in our assumptions about how
much law can accomplish. In a similar vein, we will see how much our
normative visions are not unitary but multi-vocal and how diverse is
our legal culture in interpreting those normative visions. At the-same
time, we will see the greater variety of places in which law is situ-
ated-from the streets of drug gangs to the corridors of the Supreme
Court. And legal studies-including social scientific studies of the
law-will be important points of struggle, both in the search for truth
and in the battles of progressive politics.
In my view, none of these understandings are new, but all could
easily be said to have informed the best of the early work in socio-
legal studies. Socio-legal scholars have long recognized that the law is
not self-executing, but rather often contradictory and dependent for
implementation on human actors. Similarly, legal pluralists-princi-
pally, but not exclusively, legal anthropologists-have long recognized
the multiplicity and "discursiveness" of law and law-related systems.
And who, if not socio-legal scholars, took us to the many non-court
sites of law in action? In short, I think the critique and vision of legal
study that Trubek attacks and offers is better directed at conventional
legal scholarship and education than at socio-legal studies. While so-
cio-legal studies may need some reorienting as a result of recent devel-
opments in the theory of knowledge, socio-legal studies, in my view,
always has paid some attention to the social construction of knowl-
edge. Sociology's study of the sociology of knowledge has been, I be-
lieve, more self-critical and self-conscious than jurisprudence's study
of the theory of law, at least until feminists and critical scholars re-
cently entered the field. In my view, the more important "gap" study
here is of how long it has taken traditional legal academic research
and teaching to catch up with new epistemological and theoretical de-
bates in other academic disciplines. Legal academe's resistance to so-
cio-legal studies is just another example of its collective inability to
understand the variability of human interaction around law and legal
issues, and its effort to suppress other sources of understanding and
knowledge.
If one of the things we learn about knowledge is that it is socially
constructed, then added perspectives that facilitate our understanding
of the impossibility of universalizing about law' °4 should be wel-
comed. Socio-legal studies permit us the "Durkheimian epiphanies"
that demonstrate the contextuality of our knowledge-suicide is not
104. See generally Universality, supra note 94.
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the same "social fact" for men or women who are in families or who
are alone. Rape is not the "same" experience for men and women,
though the law seems to privilege one account over another. 05
All of the researchers I have mentioned here chose their subjects
and methods with a purpose in mind. The ones I have highlighted
have all had a "point of view" or "perspective" on their subject, and
I believe all of them were "critical" in the small "c" sense of the
term, in that they sought to upset or clarify misunderstandings we
have had of our social and legal lives. I think that all socio-legal re-
searchers have to confront the questions of what political uses will be
made of their research.106 They also must decide whether they are
helping make the world a better place or reinforcing a deeply unjust
present world. In light of current issues, this means-concretely in to-
day's world-an examination of whether racist, sexist, or other biases
haunt the work, whether exposure of injustice is possible and remedia-
ble with the limited tools we have, whether the law is "imperial" in its
force, and whether other forms of social action can be employed for
progressive social change. This is clearly a "political" agenda. But I
believe that all social inquiry is "political" in that choices are made
about what to study and how to study. We cannot always control how
our work is used,1°0 but we can try to study those things that matter
and conduct our studies in a manner that treats those studied as the
human beings they are. In my view, all of the "law and" movements
have tried to come to grips with the politics of law-with law seen as
both an oppressive force and as an aspiration of human morality.
Modern socio-legal scholars who take this aspect of their work seri-
ously self-consciously choose what they study and how they study it
from this perspective. As examples, I think of the work in feminist
criminology by Kathleen Daly, 08 the spate of work on divorce re-
105. See generally S. ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987); C. MACKINNON, supra note 93.
106. In my view, many early socio-legal researchers actually became more political as a result
of their research, when they saw it commissioned and sometimes misused by the government.
This was among the reactions to the reports of the Kerner Commission on Violence (REPORT OF
rHm NATIONAL ADVISORY COMISSION ON Crv DIsoRDERs (1968)) and the Meese Commission on
Pornography (UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COhMSSION ON PORNOGRAPHY (1986)). See
generally Symposium on the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, 1987 AM. B.
FoUND. REs. J. 641.
107. My own work on legal services lawyers' resource allocation decisions was conducted at
a time when Reagan administration officials were seeking data to justify closing down the pro-
gram. See Menkel-Meadow & Meadow, Resource Allocation in Legal Services: Individual Attor-
ney Decisions in Work Priorities, 5 LAW & POL'Y Q. 237 (1983).
108. Daly & Chesney-Lind, Feminism and Criminology, 5 JUSTICE Q. 497 (1988); Daly,
Criminal Justice Ideologies and Practices in Different Voices: Some Feminist Questions About
Justice, 17 INTL' J. Soc. L. 1 (1989).
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form, 109 empirical and theoretical work on racism, discrimination, and
other forms of racial injustice, Richard Abel's new work" ° on the role
of legality in the struggle against apartheid, and continued work on
the role of legality in poverty. These are studies that seek to look at
law's role in maintaining or ameliorating injustice. The scholars con-
ducting this work are not "neutral" about their subjects. They care
deeply about the outcomes, but that does not compromise their "sci-
ence." In my view, they are "engaged" with their science, as opposed
to distanced from their science. Other versions of this work include
the "corrective" law and social science studies by those researchers
who seek to fill the gaps of our knowledge that have been created by
myopic, sexist, or racist research. This is done by reconstructing defi-
nitions (such as rape), by adding female or other excluded subjects to
the study of moral or legal reasoning and behavior,"' and by seeking
to develop or redefine new categories of analysis to expose the politi-
cal underpinnings of our work (such as the work on ideology by the
Amherst Seminar). 1I2
Trubek speaks of a recent movement toward the study of the theory
of practice as one of the "new" perspectives on law with which socio-
legal studies might engage."' It is here that I think socio-legal studies
needs to make its greater claims. For our scholarship does no good if
it is not linked to those who will actually work with law. Thus, our
moments of "Durkheimian epiphanies" must find their way into law
teaching and practice. Donald Schon has demonstrated that profes-
sional knowledge and judgment are "learned" in moments of engage-
ment in experience that represent the practice equivalent of
"Durkheimian epiphanies." Empirical insights about how law is prac-
ticed, enforced, or ignored are essential to what we teach in law
schools. Thus, Schon argues the professional school should be a place
for a "reflective practicum" that combines discipline-based knowl-
edge with practical application." 4 Law students know first hand about
the stratification of the bar, and lawyers know first hand about the
109. See, e.g., H. JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION, THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN
THE UNITED STATEs (1988); L. WEMANz , supra note 100; Marcus, Locked In and Locked Out:
Reflections on the History of Divorce Reform in New York State, 37 BUFFALO L. REv. 375
(1988-89).
110. R. Abel, The Role of Legality in the Struggle Against Apartheid, a proposal submitted
to the National Science Foundation, Law and Social Science Program (1990).
111. See generally C. GILLIGAN, supra note 101; Gender and Socio-legal Studies, 25 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. (special issue, forthcoming, 1991).
112. See Trubek & Esser, supra note 20, at 6.
113. See generally Coombe, Room for Maneuver: Toward A Theory of Practice in Critical
Legal Studies, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 69 (1989).
114. EDUCATING, supra note 4, at 306-07.
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variations in judicial and legal practices. As William Simon has noted,
most lawyers will learn more of use to them from Laurence Ross' em-
pirical study of the personal injury claims process" 5 than from trea-
tises on the development of doctrine." 6 I have never understood why
the cumulative knowledge of socio-legal studies has remained so ab-
sent from law school classrooms, including those of the clinics. Thus,
for me there is a politics of education, as well as of scholarship, and
both of these require greater engagement with the particular issues
that confront us today. So, for example, our students need to under-
stand the realities of the lower courts they will practice in more than
the doctrines developed in the Supreme Court. Research on juries and
fact-finding should inform our teaching about case presentation and
trials." 7 The vast research on dispute processing in the field of socio-
legal studies"' should inform the classroom discussions in procedure
and clinical courses in order to place decisions about litigation choices
in the more complex reality in which they are actually located for cli-
ents and practicing lawyers.
Of course, social science can be misused in practical law, too. Social
science research firms in the private sector provide mock jury analysis
of how cases should be presented that may lead to the manipulation
of case presentation and distortions of the "truth." Thus, in my view,
the political and ethical questions must be asked for educational pur-
poses as well-what are the ends to which social science is being di-
rected in law practice? This is the social science in law, not the social
science of law. ' 9
If we could go "back to the future," I would try to rewrite the fate
of socio-legal studies, not so much from the perspective of scholar-
ship, but from the perspective of legal education. The law operates
through human beings. Some forms of socio-legal studies attempt to
illuminate the patterns with which human actors use the law, and it
seems to me that engagement with the reality of law that characterizes
the best socio-legal studies would lead to deeper "Durkheimian epiph-
anies" for our students, as well as for ourselves. For in order to
change things, we need to know how things "are."
115. H.L. Ross, SETTLED OUT OF CoURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS AD-
rusTmEr (2d. ed. 1980).
116. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 778.
117. My colleague Al Moore has attempted this application of psychology and law to trial
advocacy teaching. See generally Moore, Trial By Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom,
37 UCLA L. REv. 273 (1989).
118. See generally Dispute Processing and Civil Litigation, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REv. (special
issue) (1980-81).
119. See generally Friedman, supra note 2.
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